“Democracy and aristocracy are not free states by their nature. Political liberty is found only in moderate governments. But it is not always present even in moderate states: it exists only when power is not abused. Yet eternal experience shows that every man who has power is inclined to abuse it; he goes as far as he finds limits. Who would say it? Even virtue needs limits. To prevent abuse of power, power must check power through the arrangement of things.” With these words, Montesquieu in De l'esprit des lois formulates a paradox that challenges the seemingly obvious link between democracy and freedom.
At first glance, democratic constitutions appear closely associated with the expression and preservation of freedom. Etymologically, democracy — from the Greek demos (people) and kratos (power) — refers to a regime oriented toward the interests of the people, that is, the citizens of the city. However, in his famous 1819 speech, Benjamin Constant distinguished between two ways of exercising political freedom, arguing that there exist two types of liberty: that of the Ancients and that of the Moderns.
Freedom thus appears as a foundational value of democratic regimes. The French Republic’s motto — “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” — illustrates this clearly, as does the preamble of the U.S. Constitution, which seeks to “secure the blessings of liberty.” Modern thinkers have also emphasized the central role of this ideal. In La Fin de l'histoire et le dernier homme, Francis Fukuyama argues that modern governments often seek legitimacy through democratic formulas closely tied to humanity’s deep aspiration for freedom.
From ancient Athens to modern liberal democracies, democratic regimes have therefore proclaimed their support for the ideal of liberty as a fundamental element of their social and political organization. However, the very notion of power seems to conflict with that of freedom, understood as the absence of constraints. The concept of demos therefore raises several paradoxes: who truly constitutes “the people”? Is it the majority? And if so, does that imply the existence of a minority deprived of part of its political freedom?
Many thinkers have questioned whether freedom can truly be considered a foundational principle of democracy. Alexis de Tocqueville famously argued that democracy is primarily characterized by a “passion for equality.” Democracy is undeniably linked to equality — whether in the form of Greek isonomia or the equalization of conditions. Yet this aspiration can conflict with individual liberty, since equality may restrict each person’s ability to act according to their own will.
For this reason, several philosophers have highlighted the dangers inherent in democracy. Platon criticized the excess of democratic freedom, viewing it as a source of political disorder. Alexis de Tocqueville warned against the “tyranny of the majority,” while Montesquieu emphasized humanity’s universal tendency to abuse power.
How, then, can this paradox be explained? The central issue lies in the apparent contradiction between democracy and freedom—two concepts that seem both inseparable and conflicting in political reality. Is freedom truly a fundamental principle of democracy? How can a democratic system ensure that all members of the demos respect the freedom of others? Does democracy fail because of the tension between equality and liberty, or can a balance be found that reconciles these two principles?
Ultimately, it is important to show how liberal democracies have attempted to reconcile these terms. At first glance, freedom appears as a foundation of democratic regimes (I). Yet the equalization of the members of the demos can also result in certain limitations on freedom (II). For this reason, it may be more accurate to speak of democratic constitutions rather than regimes alone: in reality, constitutional laws and institutions are what guarantee political freedom (III).
The absence of freedom brings wealth only to the tyrant, whereas freedom allows the prosperity of the entire city → therefore freedom is a fundamental democratic element.
Freedom explained by Theseus in The Suppliants by Euripides: freedom allows even the weakest person to defend themselves against the strongest.
The idea of sacrificing a minor freedom for a greater one, as explained by Benjamin Constant.
Isonomia, isegoria, and misthos in Athens guarantee freedom of judgment, speech, and political participation. In the Funeral Oration of Pericles in History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, freedom is described both in political life and in everyday life, emphasizing tolerance.
The Roman comitia (popular assemblies) as a form of civic participation.
Elections in modern democracies: the freedom to vote and universal suffrage, which define the status of citizen.
The Athenian citizen must defend the state and is therefore subject to the city. Theseus defends democracy but paradoxically behaves in a tyrannical manner.
The freedom of Athens is partly based on the lack of freedom of other poleis.
Democracy struggles to protect certain freedoms while pursuing greater collective freedoms.
Moses I. Finley criticizes Athens for its excessive freedom of speech: even enemies of democracy are allowed to speak.
The passion for equality is accompanied by a passion for freedom, but this can lead to state despotism, as argued by Alexis de Tocqueville.
The excess of freedom in democracy may lead to servitude. In Republic, Plato argues that freedom founds democracy but ultimately produces disorder and anarchy.
According to Benjamin Constant, there is a contrast between the freedom of the ancients (submission to the city and participation in public life) and the freedom of the moderns (individual independence), which often leads citizens to renounce political participation.
In antiquity: divine laws, shame as a sanction, fear, and the Twelve Tables in Rome.
The separation of powers, theorized by Montesquieu.
Economic and political liberalism. Alexis de Tocqueville identifies four forms of political freedom in the American democratic model.
According to Pericles in History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides, Athenian democracy involves voluntary self-restraint: through laws, democracy guarantees its own freedom.
The constitutional block forms the foundation of modern democracies.
There exists a social contract, in which the law is the expression of the general will, as argued by Jean-Jacques Rousseau.